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Many bilateral relationships requiring mutual agreement produce observable net-
works that are symmetric (undirected). However, the unobserved, asymmetric
(directed) network is frequently the object of scientific interest. We propose a
method that probabilistically reconstructs the latent, asymmetric network from
the observed, symmetric graph in a regression-based framework. We apply this
model to the bilateral investment treaty network. Our approach successfully re-
covers the true data generating process in simulation studies, extracts new, polit-
ically relevant information about the network structure inaccessible to alternative
approaches, and has superior predictive performance.
∗Versions of this paper were presented at the 2015 meetings of the International Political Economy
Society, the 2016 meetings of the Society for Political Methodology, and WardFest. We thank James
Fowler, Jenn Larson, and Mike Ward for useful comments. Micah Dillard provided excellent research
assistance. Ahlquist benefitted from a fellowship at Stanford’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behav-
ioral Sciences during the writing of this paper. Installation instructions for the P-GBME package and
files to replicate the analyses in this paper are available at http://github.com/s7minhas/pgbmeRepl.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social actors are often embedded in webs of relationships that profoundly shape polit-
ical and economic outcomes (Franzese and Hays, 2008; Ward, Stovel and Sacks, 2011).
One challenge in analyzing networks arises in situations where an analyst cannot fully
observe the nature of relational ties. In many dyadic interactions — treaties, marriages
— outsiders can observe ties only if both agents agree, that is, the payoff for forming a
tie exceeds its cost for both members of a dyad (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). The ob-
served network is therefore composed of symmetric (“undirected”) ties even though
the social process at work contains important relational asymmetries. The pursuit of a
tie by one party may not be reciprocated to the same extent by another.
As an illustration, supposeA,B, andC are three warring factions deciding whether
to sign bilateral peace agreements. We observe a network in which dyads (A,C) and
(B,C) have signed agreements, but the dyad (A,B) continues fighting. This observed
network of ‘peaceful’ ties could be generated from any of three unobserved sets of
relations: it may be that B failed to reciprocate A’s pursuit of peace, or vice versa, or
neither A norB pursued peace. To identify conditions that drive factions to sign peace
agreements we must account for these unobserved asymmetries. Here, the observed
symmetric graph is an incomplete representation of the underlying, asymmetric net-
work, which is frequently the object of scientific interest. We refer to this situation as
“partial observability.”
We present the partial observability generalized bilinear mixed effects model (P-
GBME) to address this challenge. The model is a synthesis of the generalized bilinear
mixed effects (GBME) model (Hoff, 2005) and the bivariate or “partial observability”
probit model (Poirier, 1980; Przeworski and Vreeland, 2002). The model can prob-
abilistically reconstruct the directed network from which the observed, undirected
graph emerged. The model enables the study of network ties in a regression frame-
work by accounting for interdependencies as well as unobserved asymmetries in net-
work relations. The stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) for networks (Snijders
and Pickup, 2017) also allows for partial observability. However, SAOM was designed
to assess how specific network features (e.g., k-star triangles) give rise to an observed
network. The latent network approach is not used to study the role of specific network
statistics. Rather, latent network models aim to account for broad patterns of network
interdependence using a variance decomposition regression framework.1
We illustrate the P-GBME model by applying it to the bilateral investment treaties
(BIT) network for each year in 1990-2012. The model substantially improves predic-
tive accuracy relative to both conventional logit and standard GBME. As important,
P-GBME extracts new information about the factors that drive treaty preferences, iden-
tifies important structural changes in the network, and highlights possible “hidden”
agreements that are easily overlooked when latent network asymmetries are ignored.
2. THE MODEL
Building on the random utility framework (McFadden, 1980), we model an actor i =
1, . . . , N as having net utility from forming a tie with another j: zij = µij + ij with µij
1See Minhas, Hoff and Ward (2016) for detailed discussion. Other approaches based on
generalized spatio-temporal dependence can also recover directed predicted probabilities Franzese,
Hays and Kachi (2012).
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representing the systematic component (that depends on observables) and ij repre-
senting the stochastic error. To account for interdependencies in actors’ utilities from
having ties, we use the “latent space” approach (Hoff, 2005) and model these utilities
as follows: (
zij
zji
)
∼ N
(
µij + ai + bj + u
′
ivj
µji + aj + bi + u
′
jvi
,
[
σ2 ρσ2
ρσ2 σ2
])
. (1)
The correlation, ρ, captures the “reciprocity” between the utilities that actors derive
from tie formation. Parameters ai and bj are sender- and receiver-specific random ef-
fects, respectively, and they capture second-order network dependencies. The vectors
ui and vi represent the location of actor i in the latent space of ‘senders’ and ‘receivers,’
respectively. These random effects capture higher-order dependencies in network ties:
i derives a large utility from forming a tie with j, if i’s location in the latent space of
‘senders’ ui is close to j’s location in the latent space of ‘receivers’ uj (so that the cross-
product u′ivj is large).2 We express the systematic components of actors’ utilities as
linear functions of predictors:
µij = β
(s)x
(s)
i + β
(r)x
(r)
j + β
(d)x
(d)
ij , (2)
µji = β
(s)x
(s)
j + β
(r)x
(r)
i + β
(d)x
(d)
ji . (3)
A researcher cannot directly observe net utility (the z’s). We only observe agents’
behaviors, in this case undirected bilateral ties. A directional tie i→ j is formed if and
only if i’s net gain from doing so is strictly positive, zij > 0. Accordingly, the bilateral
tie i ↔ j is formed if and only if both actors derive a net positive payoff from having
a tie so that zij > 0 and zji > 0. A researcher observes an undirected (bilateral) tie
yij = yji = {0, 1} arising from the following data generating process:
yij = yji =
{
1 if zij > 0 and zji > 0,
0 else. (4)
Under a standard identifying restriction σ2 = 1, the model is a partially observ-
able probit regression (Poirier, 1980), augmented with random-effects to capture un-
observed heterogeneity and inter-dyadic dependencies. Vectors x(s)i and x
(r)
i represent
the sender-specific and receiver-specific covariates, respectively. A model for the di-
rectional link i → j (eq. 11), uses variables xi as sender-specific predictors, but these
same predictors become receiver-specific in the model for the directional link j → i
(eq. 12). Vector x(d)ij contains dyad-specific variables. These dyad-specific variables
might be symmetric, xij = xji (e.g., distance between countries), or not (e.g., export-
import).
A partially observed probit model requires at least one of the following identifying
restrictions: (1) regression equations 11 and 12 must have the same parameters and/or
(2) one equation contains a predictor not included in another equation (Poirier, 1980).
If the dyadic predictors are asymmetric, xij 6= xji, then condition (2) is satisfied. Fur-
thermore, regression equations 11 and 12 have the same parameters, and so condition
2As in previous literature, these random effects are modeled as (ai, bi) ∼ N (0,Σab),
ui ∼ NK(0, σ2uI), and vi ∼ NK(0, σ2vI), where Σab, σ2u, and σ2v are unknown parameters. The choice of
K, dimensionality of the latent space, is discussed supplementary materials.
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(1) holds as well; thus, the above model is parametrically identified. However, we
impose an additional restriction that ρ = 0. While this restriction is not required for
parametric identification, Rajbhandari (2014) showed that finite sample estimates of ρ
are sensitive to the starting values and generally cannot be treated as reliable.3
We estimate the model in a Bayesian framework using Markov chain Monte Carlo.
In the supplemental materials give a more detailed exposition of the model, prior as-
sumptions, the sampling algorithm. We also provide results from a simulation study
demonstrating that the model successfully recovers known parameter values.
3. APPLICATION: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
We apply the P-GBME model to the network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
from 1990 to 2012 using the standard United Nations BIT database. There is a vibrant
debate on whether BITs boost FDI (Jandhyala, Henisz and Mansfield, 2011; Simmons,
2014; Minhas, 2016), but a proper resolution of this debate requires a convincing em-
pirical model of treaty formation (Rosendorff and Shin, 2012). Partial observability is
one key challenge in building such model: the observed network of signed bilateral
treaties is symmetric, while the underlying preferences for these treaties are asymmet-
ric.
We fit the P-GBME model separately for each year of data using a suite of covari-
ates that closely follows the existing empirical literature (see supplementary materi-
als). Our model improves on the previous literature by accounting for both network
interdependence and partial observability.
3.1. Predictive Performance
In Table 1 we compare the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive performance of
the P-GBME to that of pooled probit, which assumes dyadic independence and ig-
nores partial observability, and GBME, which models dyadic interdependencies, but
not partial observability. The predictive accuracy of the GBME model in this case is
similar to the pooled probit. Adding the partial observability component to the GBME
model, however, produces an additional substantial improvement in the predictive
accuracy as shown by all metrics for the P-GBME model.
In-sample Out-of-sample
ROC PR ROC PR
Pooled probit 0.75 0.48 0.73 0.44
GBME 0.76 0.47 0.77 0.48
P-GBME 0.90 0.71 0.91 0.78
Table 1: Predictive performance in BIT data: area under the receiver operating charac-
teristic curve (ROC) and area under the precision recall curve (PR).
3The estimation algorithm provided with this paper allows ρ to be estimated, but caution should
be used when utilizing this option.
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3.2. Regression Parameters
Existing models, including GBME, estimate a single coefficient for each predictor. This
assumes away the possibility that the same factor differentially “affects” i’s demand
for a treaty with j and i’s attractiveness to j. The P-GBME recovers directed sender-
and receiver-effects for node-level covariates. For instance, our estimates suggest that,
countries faster growth in GDP per capita were no more inclined to sign BITs with
others (sender effect). But high-growth countries were more attractive BIT partners
to others (receiver effect). Supplementary materials describes regression parameter
estimates in detail.
3.3. The Structure of Latent Treaty Preferences
The P-GBME model allows us to extract “latent preferences” for treaty formation – the
estimated probability that country i demands a treaty from j, and vice versa. Figure 1
displays the mean posterior predicted probabilities relevant to China in 1995 and 2010.
The horizontal axis represents a country’s attractiveness to China as a BIT partner and
the vertical axis is China’s attractiveness to that country. Countries above the diagonal
line find China a more attractive BIT partner than China finds them, and vice versa.
Color identifies observed BITs.
The plots reveal how China’s position in the BIT network changed over time. In
1995, China was moving aggressively to demand BITs around the world, forming ties
that the model views as relatively unlikely. By 2010, China had many more BITs in
place and is more likely to be a treaty target by the remaining countries, an indication
of China’s expanded role in the global economy.
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Figure 1: Each panels displays the posterior mean probability that China demands and
will be demanded as a BIT partner. Country labels in black designate those that had
formed a BIT with China by the specified year.
Figure 2 illustrates a different use of the P-GBME model. It shows the predicted
probabilities that the USA is demanded (left) and demands (right) a BIT in 2010. Ob-
serve that the model predicts Peru, Mexico, and Chile—the top 3 non-BITs—demand
a BIT with the USA at probabilities close to one, and are also likely BIT targets of the
USA with probabilities exceeding 0.5. Closer inspection of UN treaty data reveals that,
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by 2010, all three had signed other agreements with the US that contain provisions
functionally equivalent to BITs; these agreements do not appear in the BIT dataset
commonly used in the literature.4 The P-GBME model nevertheless highlights these
“hidden” agreements as dyads likely to have a BIT. This suggests that researchers
studying BITs need to carefully examine the dataset they employ and perhaps expand
the set of treaties considered relevant.
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Figure 2: The posterior probability a country demands a BIT (left) and is demanded
(right) with the USA in 2010 (the top and bottom decile of countries). P-GBME is good
at separating likely from unlikely treaties as well as identifying “hidden agreements.”
4. CONCLUSION
Partial observability occurs whenever the observed graph is undirected yet the under-
lying process implies directed relationships. We introduced a model that can recon-
struct the latent directed network ties, and illustrated its advantages on an example
of bilateral trade agreements. The future work in this area could focus on several ex-
tensions. First, we accounted for network dependencies using bilinear mixed effects
4The treaties are 2006 Peru-USA Free Trade Agreement (FTA), NAFTA in 1992, and the 2003
Chile-USA FTA. These agreements included investment provisions that mirror the terms of a BIT
almost exactly (see http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5454).
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framework (GBME), which could be generalized using the recently developed addi-
tive and multiplicative effects network model (Hoff, 2015; Minhas, Hoff and Ward,
2016). Second, estimating this type of network model in a fully dynamic setting (as
opposed to slicing data by time, as we did here) remains a challenge, especially when
the set of nodes changes in time.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
A. DETAILS ON THE P-GBME
As detailed in the paper, the partial observability generalized bilinear mixed effects
(P-GBME) framework treats the observed symmetric outcome, yij = yji, as resulting
from a joint decision taken by a pair of actors. We formalize the joint decision making
process using a bivariate probit model with a standard normal link function:
yij = yji =
{
1 if zij > 0 and zji > 0,
0 else, (5)(
zij
zji
)
∼ N
(
µij + ai + bj + u
′
ivj
µji + aj + bi + u
′
jvi
,
[
σ2 ρσ2
ρσ2 σ2
])
, (6)
(ai, bi)
′ ∼ N (0,Σab) , (7)
ui ∼ NK(0, σ2uI), (8)
vi ∼ NK(0, σ2vI). (9)
ai and bj represent sender and receiver random effects that account for first order
dependence patterns that often arise in relational data, while u′ivj captures the likeli-
hood of a pair of actors interacting with one another based on third order dependence
patterns such as transitivity, balance, and clustering. For identification purposes, we
fix σ2 = 1 and ρ = 0. The former is a standard restriction in probit frameworks with a
binary outcome. We undertake the latter restriction because Rajbhandari (2014) shows
that in this framework it is difficult to recover reliable estimates for ρ as the parameter
is highly sensitive to the initial value.
The sender and receiver random effects (ai and bj) are drawn from a multivariate
normal distribution centered at zero with a covariance matrix, Σab, parameterized as
follows:
Σab =
(
σ2a σab
σab σ
2
b
)
(10)
The nodal effects are modeled in this way to account for the fact that in many
relational datasets we often find that actors who send a lot of ties are also more likely
to receive a lot of ties. Heterogeneity in the the sender and receiver effects is captured
by σ2a and σ2b , respectively, and σab describes the covariance between these two effects.
µ represents the systematic component of actors’ utilities and is expressed as a
linear function of sender (s), receiver (r), and dyadic (d) covariates:
µij = β
(s)x
(s)
i + β
(r)x
(r)
j + β
(d)x
(d)
ij , (11)
µji = β
(s)x
(s)
j + β
(r)x
(r)
i + β
(d)x
(d)
ji . (12)
This formulation allows us to incorporate exogenous actor and dyad level charac-
teristics into how actors make decisions within the partial probit framework. Follow-
ing Hoff (2005), to enable a more efficient estimation, we reparameterize the model
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to implement hierarchical centering of the random effects (Gelfand, Sahu and Carlin,
1995):
zi,j ≈ N (β(d)x(d)ij + si + rj + u′ivj), (13)
si = β
(s)x
(s)
i + ai, (14)
rj = β
(s)x
(r)
j + bj. (15)
A.1. Parameters and Priors
To estimate the parameters discussed in the previous section, we utilize conjugate
priors and a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm. Prior distributions for
the parameters are specified as follows:5
• β(s), β(r), and β(d) are each drawn from multivariate normals with mean zero and a
covariance matrix in which the covariances are set to zero and variances to 10
• Σa,b ∼ inverse Wishart(I2×2, 4)
• σ2u, and σ2v are each drawn from an i.i.d. inverse gamma(1,1).
Starting values for each of the parameters are determined using maximum likeli-
hood estimation.
A.2. The MCMC algorithm
To estimate this model a Gibbs sampler is used. This sampler follows the procedure
laid out in Hoff (2005, 2009) with the exception of the first step in which we extend the
GBME by accounting for the possibility that seemingly symmetric events are the result
of a joint decision between a pair of actors. This first step involves sampling from a
truncated normal distribution, we show the full conditional distribution below.
1. Modeling partially observable outcome. Conditional on there being an observed
link between i and j, and conditional on other parameters, we draw the latent
variables zij and zji from the bivariate normal distribution such that both latent
variables are positive:(
zij
zji
∣∣∣∣ yij = 1) ∼ N ( µij + ai + bj + u′ivjµji + aj + bi + u′jvi ,
[
σ2 ρσ2
ρσ2 σ2
])
1{zij > 0 ∩ zji > 0}.
Conditional yij = 0 (there is no observed link between i and j), we sample the
latent variables from the bivariate normal distribution where at least one of the
latent variables, zij or zji, is constrained to be negative:(
zij
zji
∣∣∣∣ yij = 0) ∼ N ( µij + ai + bj + u′ivjµji + aj + bi + u′jvi ,
[
σ2 ρσ2
ρσ2 σ2
])
1{zij < 0 ∪ zji < 0}.
2. Additive effects
5For details on the full conditional distributions of each of the parameters see Hoff (2005).
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• Sample β(d), s, r | β(s),β(r),Σa,b, Z,U ,V (linear regression)
• Sample β(s),β(r) | s, r,Σa,b (linear regression)
• Sample Σa,b from full conditional distribution
3. Multiplicative effects6
• For i = 1, . . . , n:
– Sample ui | {uj, j 6= i}, Z,β(d), s, r, σ2u, σ2v ,V (linear regression)
– Sample vi | {vj, j 6= i}, Z,β(d), s, r, σ2u, σ2v ,U (linear regression)
A.3. Simulation Exercise
To test the capabilities of the P-GBME framework in representing the data generat-
ing process for a partially observable outcome we conduct a simulation exercise. In
each simulation, we randomly construct a directed network from a pair of dyadic co-
variates, nodal covariates, and the random effects structure detailed in the previous
section. The regression parameters for the dyadic covariates are set at 1 and -1/2, and
the parameters for the nodal covariates are set at 0 and 1/2. At this stage, the network
simulated from this data generating process is directed. We modify the simulated net-
work so that a link between a dyad only appears in the network if both the i, j dyad
and the j, i dyad both have a link in the simulated network, thus making the network
appear undirected.
Next, we examine whether the P-GBME model can recover the data generating
process underlying the partially observed simulated network. We run the P-GBME
model in every simulation for 20,000 iterations with a 10,000 burn-in period. We repeat
this simulation process 100 times.
With the simulation results our first step is to examine whether the P-GBME accu-
rately recovers the regression parameter estimates for the dyadic and nodal covariates.
To test whether this is the case we calculate the mean regression parameter estimate
from the MCMC results for each simulation, and we summarize these results in Fig-
ure 1. For each parameter we indicate its true value by a colored horizontal line and
summarize the distribution of the mean regression values estimated from the P-GBME
using a boxplot. Given that for each of the parameters the true value almost exactly
crosses the median value indicated in the box plot, this simulation shows that the P-
GBME is quite effective in estimating the true parameter values underlying a partially
observed outcome.
6See Hoff (2009) for further details on how multiplicative effects are estimated in a directed context
within the GBME framework.
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Figure 1: Boxplot of mean value of regression parameters estimated using the P-GBME
across 100 simulations. Horizontal colored lines indicate the true parameter values.
We also examine the proportion of times that the true value falls within the 95%
credible interval of the estimated regression parameter. In over ninety percent of the
simulations, the true value falls within the 95% credible interval of each of the es-
timated regression parameters from the P-GBME. Specifically, for β(d,1) the coverage
rate is 0.85, for β(d,2) 0.93, for β(s) 0.93, and for β(r) 0.97.
B. ESTIMATION AND APPLICATION
B.1. Data
Table B1 provides a description for each of the variables used in the analysis.
Table B1: Variables in the analysis
Variable Level Definition Source
BIT dyadic 1 if i & j Signed a BIT by year t UNCTAD7
UDS (median) dyadic |UDSit−UDSjt| Pemstein et al. (2010)
Law & Order dyadic |LOit−LOjt| ICRG8
Log(GDP per capita) dyadic |Log(GDPcap)it−Log(GDPcap)jt| WDI
OECD dyadic 1 if i& j Both OECD members by year t OECD
Distance dyadic Minimum distance between i&j Gleditsch & Ward (2001) 9
FDI/GDP node Net FDI inflow as % GDP in year t WDI
ICSID Disputes node Cumulative number of disputes by year t ICSID10
GDP per capita growth node Level of GDP per capita growth by year t WDI
PTAs node Cumulative number of PTAs signed by year t DESTA11
11
A shortcoming of the existing GBME framework is its inability to account for ap-
plications where there is missingness in the set of exogenous covariates used in the
model. For our application, a number of the nodal covariates had varying levels of
missingness. Additionally, most of the dyadic covariates that we construct from nodal
variables, such as the unified democracy scores, also have varying levels of missing-
ness. The table below shows how much missingness we had for the variables included
in our analysis:
Table B2: Missingness among variables used in the analysis
Variable Proportion of Cases Missing
Law & Order 16.6%
FDI/GDP 2.8%
GDP per capita 1.4%
GDP per capita growth 1.4%
Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) 0.7%
ICSID Disputes 0%
PTAs 0%
OECD 0%
In general, the level of missingness is not high. The only exception here is with
the Law & Order variable from the ICRG dataset, for this variable we had approxi-
mately 17% of country-year observations missing from 1990 to 2012. The only true
dyadic variable we include in our analysis is a calculation of the minimum distance
between countries, and this variable has no missingness. Additionally, our dependent
variable measuring whether or not two countries had signed a BIT by year t also has
no missingness.
A number of works have noted the issues that can arise when simply using listwise
deletion,12 thus before running the P-GBME sampler we impute missingness among
the covariates used in our model with a Bayesian, semi-parametric copula imputation
scheme.13 We generate 1,000 imputed datasets from this imputation scheme and save
10 for use in the P-GBME MCMC sampler.
To account for missingness within the P-GBME, at the beginning of every iteration
of the MCMC for model, we draw a randomly sampled imputed dataset from the
posterior of the Copula, calculate the parameters associated with the P-GBME using
the imputed dataset, and repeat this process for every iteration of the sampler for the
model. This approach directly incorporates imputation uncertainty into our posterior
distributions of the P-GBME parameters without having to run and combine separate
models.
B.2. Estimation details
In our application we estimate the P-GBME separately for each year from 1990 to 2012
using the prior distributions and MCMC algorithm described above. For each year,
12See, for example, King et al. (2001).
13See Hoff (2007); Hollenbach et al. (2016) for details on this imputation scheme and how it differs
from other approaches frequently utilized in political science.
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we ran the P-GBME MCMC sampler for 20,000 iterations, discarding the first 10,000
iterations as burn-in. We thinned the chain by saving only every 10th value.
The following trace plot describes MCMC convergence for all parameters in the
2012 P-GBME model.
Figure 2: Traceplot for 2012 P-GBME results.
B.3. Regression Parameters
Figure 3 displays the posterior mean and the 90% (thicker) and 95% (thinner) credible
intervals (CIs). The first column contains the dyadic covariates; the second, sender-
level covariates; and, the third, receiver covariates. In each panel, we show the pa-
rameter estimates for that variable from 1990 to 2012. The dotted horizontal line is 0
and the thicker grey line is the posterior mean, pooling the posterior draws across all
years.
The P-GBME recovers directed sender- and receiver-effects for node-level covari-
ates from an observed undirected network, something that other approaches, includ-
ing the GBME, are unable to do. Our estimation in this application indicates substan-
tial instability in these estimates over time, both relative to a baseline of 0 and relative
to the pooled posterior mean. This instability is consistent with substantive arguments
that the incentives to sign BITs have changed over time (Jandhyala, Henisz and Mans-
field, 2011).
Dyadic covariates tend to be more stable across years in this application. But they,
too, show that the BIT formation process has changed over time. Economic and polit-
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Figure 3: Left-most plot shows results by year for the dyadic parameters, next shows
parameter results for sender covariates, and right-most plot show results for receiver
covariates. Points in each of the plots represents the average effect for the parameter
and the width the 90 and 95% credible intervals. The grey bar in the panels represents
the average effect of the parameter across all years. Dark shades of blue and red indi-
cate that the 95% CI does not contain 0 and lighter shades implies that the 0 is not in
the 90% credible interval. Parameters in grey are are ones where 0 is inside the 90%
credible interval.
ical “distance”, for example, has become less important as the network evolved and
more lower-income countries have signed BITs with each other. Geographic distance,
on the other hand, continues to be strongly related to the formation of BITs.
P-GBME covariate estimates shed light on the evolving processes producing the
observed BIT network in the 1990-2012 period. The changing values of covariate pa-
rameters over time also indicates that common practice of pooling dyads and assum-
ing the existence of temporally stable parameters may be dangerous.
B.4. Choosing dimension of the multiplicative effects, K
One of the parameters that users are able to set within the P-GBME to account for
third order dependence patterns is K – see the MCMC algorithm section above for
more details on this parameter and its relation to the model. In the results reported in
the paper, we setK = 2. To understand whether or not a higher value ofK is necessary
users of this approach can compare the in-sample fit of the model with varying values
for K. In our application exercise, we varied K from 1 to 3 to settle on an appropriate
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value of K that can represent the data generating process of the network. Results are
shown in Table B3 below.
Table B3: In-sample performance results from running the P-GBME on data from 2012
with varying values of K.
AUC (ROC) AUC (PR)
K=1 0.87 0.63
K=2 0.90 0.71
K=3 0.92 0.71
As you can see after K=2, the subsequent in-sample performance improvement
notably declines. There is a slight increase in performance fromK=2 toK=3, however,
every time one increases K we are also adding 2 ∗ n more parameters to the P-GBME
model. Adding this many more parameters can easily lead one to overfit the data in
an out-of-sample context.
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